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'Wait a Minute. This Is Where I Came In." 
A Trial Lawyer's Search for Alternative Dispute 
Resolution 
Steven H. Goldberg* 
The first question about alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
is: "Alternative to  what?" 
As a latecomer to the ADR dialogue, I fist heard this ques- 
tion a t  the initial session of the Hewlett Socio-Legal Institute on 
Dispute Resolution, in the Spring of 1993. Twenty-five of 
us-social psychologists, judges, social workers, business admin- 
istrators, labor mediators, practicing lawyers, communications 
teachers, law teachers, social scientists, graduate students, dis- 
pute resolution professionals, and myself, an about-to-be-ex-law 
dean-were spending our first of thirty days together in an Ohio 
State University Law School classroom. We were there to  dis- 
cuss ADR with Deborah Hensler, Carol King, Craig McEwen, 
Nancy Rogers, the late Maurice Rosenberg, Frank Sander, and 
Gerald Williams, among others. Most of the Institute attendees 
knew our leaders were among the giants in the field. One of us 
had no clue he was about to view the landscape of the ADR 
movement with some of the very best. 
One of these giants, I do not remember who, began the open- 
ing session with "the first question about ADR," no doubt as a 
teaching device more than an inquiry for which the answer was 
truly in doubt. I was the only person in the room who knew al- 
most nothing about ADR, but even I knew the answer. So did 
everyone else. Of course, all of our answers were somewhat dif- 
ferent, reflecting our different experiences, professional back- 
grounds, socio-political philosophies, and aspirations. Except for 
me, the Institute participants had one important thing in com- 
mon, each considered herself or himself a card-carrying member 
of the ADR movement.' 
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. 
1. The author has spent about equal t i m e a  decadeas a trial lawyer, a dean, 
and a full-time law teacher. Though occasionally active as an arbitrator and intensely 
interested in making litigation less painN for clients and lawyers, the author cannot 
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Four years after that June morning in Columbus, following 
some ADR practice and reading: I, too, teach an ADR course and 
I, too, use "the first question about ADR" as the pathway into 
the subject. But after :Four years of searching, I have a different 
answer to that first question than the answer I knew, when I 
knew nothing about the subject. 
My original answer to  the question "Alternative to  what?" 
was "the adversary system." ADR held out the promise of a 
better way than the adversary system for handling at least some 
of the inevitable friction in society. I could not define "better" 
precisely, but it contained notions of faster, cheaper, less conten- 
tious, less aggravating, or more likely to leave the parties talk- 
ing to each other when the process was over. 
My current answer to  the question "Alternative to what?" is 
that ADR is not an alternative. Alternative Dispute Resolution 
courses have become Dispute Resolution. In this society, dispute 
resolution is the adversary system. My unhappiness with the 
current answer is the reason for this essay and for its suggestion 
that the ADR movement, and particularly the law teachers 
within it, think again about the direction it should take. 
In the classic sense of the outsider looking in, the ADR 
movement has made it to  "in7' status. During this decade, its 
various forms have become commonplace in many American 
courthouses. The movement is snowballing, as the number of 
forms and the number of courthouses grows every year. A decade 
ago, only a few law schools offered a course in ADR. Today, dis- 
pute resolution has become a staple elective in most schools (just 
claim to be part of the ADR movement. The search for ADR reported here, with its 
unfortunate conclusion, is the search of a trial lawyer. 
2. There is much to read for one who jumps into the subject of ADR without 
previous background. I have listed the material that I found most helpful and most 
thought provoking in a bibliography at  the end of the essay. Many of the ideas in this 
essay come from these readings or from conversations with the authors. 
I dislike having my reading interrupted by a footnote, only to find that the 
reference is to an idea not important enough for the text, but too dear to the author 
to exclude. At other times, I break the train of thought, only to be told in the footnote 
that five other people have at  one time or another said the same thing that the author 
has said in text, as if the earlier observations made it  true when the author's assertion 
would not. Except for the first two footnotes, this essay contains no textual footnotes 
and no attribution citations for propositions that have been previously stated by others. 
Names of authors and articles that are worth mentioning are mentioned in text. 
Footnotes appear solely to provide a citation for the reader who wishes to locate the 
original document or attributed idea referred to in the text. 
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as tax, corporations, and other popular electives). Course books 
expand as the courts develop more of what Professor Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow has called "The Law of ADR."3 Can a Restate- 
ment of the Law of ADR be far behind? 
I liked it better when ADR was not fast becoming part and 
parcel of society's main dispute resolution apparatus. The most 
important word in "ADR movement" was "alternative." It was 
the soul of the idea, its substance. Today, the form is succeeding, 
but the substance is dying. More precisely, the substance is dy- 
ing because the form is succeeding. The alternative in ADR has 
become a victim of its own success. 
Of course, many in the ADR movement will disagree. They 
will contend that Professor Frank Sander's innovative vision of a 
multi-door courthouse,4 has become reality, in one form or an- 
other, and that ADR is having a profound influence on dispute 
resolution in America. As  in all things, where one stands de- 
pends largely upon where one sits. 
For a decade a t  the end of the 1960s and through most of the 
1970s, I sat a t  counsel tables in courtrooms, trying everything 
from antitrust to zoning, with the most common stops a t  con- 
tracts, criminal, estates, family, and tort. The legal community 
was relatively small in our county seat in Minnesota and the 
number of trial lawyers was even smaller. We had a civil pretrial 
system that was more disclosure than discovery, and a criminal 
trial system that was a mixture of "ambush trial" and wrangling 
over the new "rights" the Warren Court had discovered, while 
turning over the rocks in the garden of the Bill of Rights. Civil 
disputes were settled without much falderal when they could be, 
and tried quickly when they could not. Clients were as satisfied 
as possible, given a system in which one side loses. Members of 
the community a t  large gave little thought to their justice sys- 
tem, when not personally involved, and maintained a grudging 
respect for lawyers. Lawyer jokes were outnumbered by Polish 
3. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale 
of Innovation Co-opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
4. For a description of how the "multi-door courthouse" might work see infm pp. 
13-14. See generally Rank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 
(1976). Although Sander does not use the term "multi-door courthouse" this is a term 
used by others to describe his ideas. See, e.g., Gladys Kessler & Linda J. Finkelstein, 
The Evolution of a Multi-door Courthouse, 37 CATH. U .  L. REV. 577 (1988); Je f iey  W. 
Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait 
Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fle&ling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DLSP. RESOL. 297, 
324 (1996). 
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jokes, in our largely Polish community. Trying cases was fun and 
most of the trial lawyers were friends, there being no one else 
willing to  listen to trial stories for more than a drink or two. The 
last thing any lawyer in our community was 'searching for was an 
alternative to  the relatively efficient, relatively just, relatively 
enjoyable, and relatively profitable dispute resolution system 
that we served and, paradoxically, over which we were the mas- 
ters. 
Toward the end of the 1970s, I found myself more often sit- 
ting in a chair in the conference room of a large Minneapolis law- 
firm, or in court chambers, wrangling about what was and what 
was not discoverable in a civil action. Trials were rarer. Deposi- 
tions, motions, and fighting over procedures were more common. 
Early settlements were harder to  come by. Cases took longer to 
come to trial. Lawyers were less pleasant. Clients were less sat- 
isfied. And Chief Justice Warren Burger, a one-time lawyer from 
across the river in St. Paul, was complaining about the diminu- 
tion of the quality of lawyering in America and the litigation 
mess in the justice ~ystem.~ 
The Chief Justice was probably more concerned about crimi- 
nal defense lawyers bombarding the federal courts (his, in partic- 
ular) with rights claims for criminal defendants and prisoners 
than he was for the quality of the examination and argument 
skills in state trial courts. And he may have cared more about 
the "unimportant" personal injury diversity suits taking federal 
court time away from "important" corporate litigation than he 
did about reforming the process of dispute resolution. His pro- 
nouncements on both lawyering and law reform, nevertheless, 
carried the weight of his office and the breadth of its influence. 
The 1976 Pound Conference in St. Paul, Minnesota6 is often cited 
as a watershed in the legal history of the twentieth century, the 
time when the legal establishment embraced ADR and, in partic- 
ular, Professor Sander's multi-door courth~use.~ 
There is a difference between marking a date and identifying 
causes of change. It is the embrace of ADR with which I am here 
5.  See Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized 
Training and Ce&-fiation ole Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 
FORDHAM L. REV. 227 (1973). 
6. Pound Conference: Perspectives on Justice in the Future. Proceedings of the 
National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration 
of Justice. (A.L. Levin & R.R. Wheeler, eds., 1979). 
7 .  See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 4. 
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concerned. The Pound Conference may have had a coincident 
existence with the growth of the ADR movement, but other 
forces were changing the legal landscape. 
By the early 1980s, I was sitting in the ivory tower of acade- 
mia watching the justice system on its way to  free-fall. The legal 
profession's ability to  acculturate and finish the training of law 
school graduates through guided experience had been completely 
swamped by the rapidly multiplying number of graduates. The 
exponential increase in unmonitored pretrial activity in civil 
cases and the accompanying shenanigans (an urban practice 
phenomenon-mostly in New York-for more than a decade 
earlier) were spreading across the breadth of the legal profession 
from North Dakota to  Mississippi. In addition, the huge increase 
in the number of lawyers, the insurance industry's insistence 
that there was a litigation explosion, and television's often criti- 
cal spotlight on the real and fiction of law practice were provid- 
ing fuel for the smoldering coals of public disdain for lawyers. 
I sat where most lawyers sat. The "impending crisis" in the 
justice system was the grist for classes in professional responsi- 
bility and bar association conferences, for occasional hand wring- 
ing, and for suggestions to make litigation more efficient and 
lawyers more civil. Although Professor Laura Nader, a one-time 
supporter and insightful anthropological observer of the ADR 
movement, claims that lawyers fueled the ADR explosion in the 
years following the Pound Conference: ADR was not part of the 
"impending crisis" dialogue for most of the nation's practicing 
lawyers. There were, to  be sure, a few pioneers and innovators in 
academia, and even fewer in practice, who saw alternative meth- 
ods of dispute resolution as an important answer to  the growing 
discontent about lawyers and justice. But those innovators were 
a tiny minority among lawyers. In the late 1970s and the early 
1980s, most lawyers were not searching for ADR. 
The social phenomenon known as "the ADR movement" 
started mostly outside of the law. The lawyers thinking about 
ADR were an even more insignificant minority in the ADR move- 
ment than in the legal profession. The modern ADR movement 
started in the late 1960s and 1970s, with neighborhood centers, 
marriage counselors, conflict resolution types (social scientists, 
8. See Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Pmctice of law: Hierarchy and 
Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 1, 3, 6-7 (1993). 
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for want of a better term), and a host of other nonlawyers and 
nonlawyer groups actively seeking kinder processes, empower- 
ment of disputants, and better, longer-lasting relationships be- 
tween disputants. A pervasive system of mediation and arbitra- 
tion for resolving labor disputes and the American Arbitration 
Association (both with heavy involvement from lawyers) were 
well established by the 1960s, but they were not part of what 
Professor Nader identifies as the modern ADR movement's "har- 
mony ide~logy."~ 
The ADR moveme~it-at least the part that was concerned 
with making fundamental changes in the way society resolved 
disputes-enjoyed mociest success in the late 1970s and early 
1980s as various groups and communities increasingly tried me- 
diation as a way for solving problems-mostly small problems. 
But the ADR movement made little progress in changing the 
dispute resolution culture of the country. There were, to be sure, 
ADR systems in a number of commercial communities (like the 
diamond industry), but most of these were historical and unre- 
lated to any push from the modern ADR movement. A significant 
exception was the Center for Public Resources, an organization 
to support ADR, founded by major corporate counsel seeking a 
way to reduce the cost of resolving major business disputes. 
As Professor Nader suggests, the ADR movement did not 
begin to have any widespread influence in society until many of 
the movers and shakers in the legal community began to see 
ADR as a solution to the "crisis" in the justice system.1° 
That is the time where I came in-along with a lot of other 
lawyers. Toward the end of the 1980s the "impending crisis" in 
the justice system had matured into a "full-blown crisis." From 
my seat in the law school teaching trial advocacy, and from an 
occasional perch in the world of practice, I joined the growing 
group of academics and practitioners who were asking aloud 
whether the current operation of the adversary system of justice 
was sufficient for society's needs. Litigation appeared so costly, 
so interminable, so freighted with procedural wrangling, core- 
ugly, and inaccessible for most of the disagreements that most of 
society wanted to resolve, that it seemed beyond salvage. Tinker- 
ing with the system might not make enough difference to be 
worth the effort. More law schools were developing courses in 
9. See id. 
10. See id. 
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ADR. Private dispute resolution enterprises were beginning to 
spring up in areas of heavy population. Judges were beginning to 
wonder whether some of these "other" dispute resolution ideas 
might be saviors for their dockets, rather than threats to their 
dispute resolution monopoly. 
By the time of the 1993 Hewlett Institute, I had become a 
full-fledged skeptic about the usefulness of the adversary sys- 
tem-at least for most civil disputes. It may have been due to 
the four years spent as Dean of the Pace University Law School, 
away from the day-to-day teaching and practice of law. It may 
have been moving to New York, where everything that had 
seemed troublesome in Minnesota's version of urban America 
seemed disastrous in New York's seemingly rotten apple. The 
more removed I had become from participation in the system, 
the clearer it had become that the encrustations that pretrial 
wrangling had placed on trial decision making were killing it-at 
least killing the adversary system that had seemed so useful in 
my trial practice of the 1970s. In any event, I could not resist the 
allure of ADR and the chance to teach and write about some- 
thing that might be useful to a society increasingly estranged 
from an overly complex dispute resolution system. 
I flew to Columbus with the same anticipation that most 
judges and some lawyers had as they flew ADR in hopes of salva- 
tion. Somewhere in the wisdom of the ADR movement I would 
find the key to making litigation less costly, aggravating, and 
time-consuming, and more accessible, streamlined, and respon- 
sive to the needs of most citizens who had disagreements to be 
resolved. And if it cleaned up the congestion in the courts a t  the 
same time, that would be okay, too. 
I entered the classroom that first day having served as an 
arbitrator in a number of matters, knowing something about 
(though never having participated in) mediation, and having 
heard something about minitrials, but knowing nothing beyond 
the name. I was ready to be taught by the law professors, law- 
yers, and judges who had thought about how ADR could help fix 
the adversary system. 
The first shock was the class. I expected to find a room full of 
practicing lawyers and law professors who were experienced in 
ADR and meeting to share their experiences, wisdom, and ideas 
for the future. There were a couple of practicing lawyers and law 
professors in the room but they were badly outnumbered by the 
social scientists and others of various nonlaw descriptions. What 
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was someone from interpersonal communications going to  offer 
about streamlining the expensive and interminable wrestling 
before trial? Was a psychologist really going to  know anything 
important about deciding cases--or finding some way other than 
trial to  make law? 
The second shock was finding that I was not starting from 
zero; I was somewhe~re in the hole. I not only knew very little 
about ADR, the little I knew about arbitration was the least 
important part of ADlR with which the Institute would be con- 
cerned. 
The third shock was finding that most of the participants and 
teachers in the Institute thought that the common-law trial (the 
only part of the system that I thought was still working) was the 
dispute resolution mechanism for which an alternative was most 
needed. 
Over the month of the Institute, I learned that different indi- 
viduals had varying reasons for preferring ADR to the common- 
law trial. Although it was not then apparent, my colleagues' 
reasons for preferring alternatives to  trials were subject to  cate- 
gorizations that reveal much about the ADR movement. As I 
look back on it now, the participants and teachers in the Hewlett 
Institute were fairly representative of the entire ADR move- 
ment. Their reactions and comments, though not a perfect reflec- 
tion of the entire AD:R movement, are close enough so that the 
Institute serves as a pretty good surrogate. 
At the risk of oversimplification, the Institute participants 
fell into two groups: those who sought an alternative to  common- 
law trials because tiials were too inefficient, and those who 
sought an alternative because common-law trials were too hard 
on disputants, lawyers, and society in general. The groups were 
neither self-conscious nor self-identifying. The articulation of 
positions on various ADR issues was never aimed at demonstrat- 
ing the dichotomy, even though some of the readings invited the 
discussion. At the time of the Institute, I had neither the experi- 
ence with nor the knowledge of ADR to notice what is now ap- 
parent to  me. But the two groups are identifiable and important 
for the observations ,and suggestions that follow in the second 
and third parts of this essay. 
It is tempting to  suggest that the two parts of the ADR move- 
ment represent the ideological split Professor Robert Baruch 
Bush claims is central to the adjudication/mediation controversy: 
the "liberallindividualist" vision of society versus the "communi- 
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tarianlrelationist" vision.ll While there is certainly an element of 
that division separating the two groups, there is both more and 
less to  it than that. 
The liberahdividualist was not represented in full flower at 
the Institute. There were no outright opponents of ADR in atten- 
dance, though Professor Fiss's important critique of ADR, 
Against Settlement,12 was one of the first readings. There were 
some rights-based advocates, but as to  the adjudication system, 
they were of the no-reason-to-do-away-with-it-completely kind, 
rather than the it's-the-natural-order-of-things-and-should-be- 
left-untouched variety. Moreover, the topics of the Institute, save 
for the introduction, did not lend themselves to debating the 
efficacy of ADR. The Institute mainly attracted people who were 
already part of the ADR choir. The communitarian/relationist, 
therefore, was more in evidence, though one had to  listen be- 
tween the lines and understand the history and makeup of the 
ADR movement to hear the importance of the ideology to some of 
the positions taken. Being the only one in the room who was 
neither a member of the choir nor knowledgeable about ADR, I 
was hard of hearing. I make the observations in this essay 
mostly from the echo. 
Law training was an important, though not universal, differ- 
ence between the two groups in the Institute. Including the au- 
thor, there were two ex-tial lawyers, one judge, and no practic- 
ing trial lawyers in the group. Those with law training were 
mostly law teachers or lawyers "practicing" ADR. 
"Trial" was almost the universal answer to  the "Alternative 
to  what?" question, but the meaning of "trial" and the rationale 
for finding an alternative were different between the two groups. 
Most of the nonlawyers in the group disliked the trial for its 
method. Most of the lawyers claimed to  be at least neutral about 
trials, but were concerned about their cost in time, money, and 
court resources. Those nonlawyers who thought trials ought to 
be replaced by better methods also made the antitrial arguments 
of the lawyers about cost to  clients, time for resolution, and 
wasted societal resources. Those lawyers who thought that trials 
were too expensive, time-consuming, and wasteful of the govern- 
ment's resources also made the antitrial arguments of the 
11. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and Adjudication, Dispute Resolution 
and Ideology: An Imaginary Conversation, 3 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 15 (1989). 
12. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). 
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nonlawyers about finding methods for resolving disputes that 
were kinder and gent1e:r on all involved in the process. 
It is now clear that when the nonlawyers said "trial," they 
used it as shorthand for adversarial dispute resolution. When 
the lawyers said "trial," they meant trial. These different per- 
spectives on the same answer to the "Alternative to what?'ques- 
tion reflect an important division in the ADR movement, one 
with its roots in the movement's diverse origins. There are those 
in the ADR movement who think the adversary system of dis- 
pute resolution is little more than a pagan right that ought to  be 
excised root and branch. There are those who think that engraft- 
ing the ADR forms and some of the underlying philosophy onto 
the adversary system will fix it. The excisers (mostly 
nonlawyers) would replace all adjudication with mediation, if 
they could. The engrafters (mostly lawyers) would put negotia- 
tion, early neutral evaluation, mediation, minitrial, summary 
trial, and arbitration into every courthouse. While I do not mean 
to suggest that the ex~iserslengrafters division defines actively 
opposing groups in the ADR movement, I do suggest that the 
ADR movement combines two groups that arrive at the move- 
ment with different approaches and training. Recognizing that 
difference is helpful in gaining an understanding of the current 
and future states of ADR, much in the same way that Professor 
Baruch Bush's liberallindividuajlists versus communi- 
tarianlrelationists dichotomy is useful in understanding the heat 
in the mediation versus adjudication debate. 
The Hewlett Institute consideration of ADR forms began 
with negotiation. The discussion leader suggested that if one was 
looking for an alternative to the pervasive method of dispute 
resolution in society, it was negotiation, not trial, that was to be 
replaced because negotiation, not trial, resolves most disputes. 
As a trial lawyer, I had always thought of negotiation as part of 
the trial process. The distinction between negotiation and trial 
was therefore lost on me-until I heard the nonlawyers begin to 
discuss negotiation. 
The nonlawyers did not share my view that negotiation was 
part of the trial process-a reality that Professor Marc Galanter 
has identified and labeled "litigotiati~n."~~ They discussed negoti- 
13. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle? Judicial Promotion and 
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1342 n.14 (1994) (citing and 
explaining Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal 
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ation as if it were a process that could be divorced entirely from 
the adversary system and, more importantly, from 
adversarialism. For them, negotiation was the basic process that 
could convert the primary flaw of adjudication-the inevitability 
of zero-sum resolutions (someone wins, someone loses), into the 
panacea of problem solving-the potential for win-win resolu- 
tions (everyone smiles). The lawyers in the group, particularly 
the negotiation teachers, shared the same ideas about effective 
negotiation technique and used the same language to explain 
negotiation styles as the nonlawyers, but their discussion of the 
subject did not carry the same overtone of panacea. 
Professor Gerald Williams' path-breaking study on law- 
yerlnegotiator types14 and his class material, with its echoes of 
Jungian psychology,15 set the tone for our consideration of nego- 
tiation. The nonlawyers heard it as an a h a t i o n  of their view 
that negotiation could be a problem-solving alternative to trial 
resolutions, if only lawyers would learn to negotiate in the 
proper spirit. The lawyers heard it as a description of different 
techniques that might work well to  provide an advantage in ne- 
gotiation (an adversarial process by nature) even if the negotia- 
tion was in pursuit of a commercial transaction having nothing 
to  do with a trial. 
Had I the background to listen properly, I would have been 
able to  infer, from the nonlawyers' view of negotiation, that 
when they spoke of trial as the process for which an alternative 
was important, they really meant the adversary system. I would 
have understood that the gulf between the nonlawyers and the 
lawyers in the ADR movement had great potential for growth. 
Our mediation discussion provided a simple example. The 
lawyers saw mediation as a tool for prodding a stalled negotia- 
tion into a settlement that would avoid trial. Anything the neu- 
tral mediator could do to  achieve a settlement (short of deciding 
for the parties-and maybe even that) was appropriate, because 
achieving settlement was the standard for success. To borrow 
two-thirds of Pr'ofessor James Alfini's elegant trilogy,16 the 
heavy-handed "trashing" of the disputants' legal positions or the 
Process, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 268 (1984)). 
14. See GERALD R. WILLIAhiS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND S E ~ L E ~ I E N T  15-46 (1983). 
15. For a full exposition of Pmfessor Williams' approach, see Gerald R. Williams, 
Negotiation as a Healing Process, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 1. 
16. See James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing it Out: Is This the End 
of "Good Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47 (1991). 
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"bashing" of their dollar positions, until they met in the middle 
was fine, so long as it worked. 
The nonlawyers saw mediation as the paradigmatic alterna- 
tive to the trial. "Haslling" (Alfini's third mediator style) in a 
consensual mediation, so that the mediator's orchestration would 
facilitate empowerment and create the transformative process, 
was the only acceptable method of mediation for the nonlawyers. 
Without consent, empowerment, and transformation, there was 
little value in a mediated settlement. 
The significance of the difference in approach between the 
nonlawyers and lawyers was not as apparent to me as it should 
have been, because the lawyerlmediator debate raged at the 
same time. The suggestion that only lawyers should be allowed 
to  mediate was the first issue in the Institute to divide explicitly 
along 1awyerlnonlawye:r lines. The idea that only lawyers could 
be effective mediators drove the nonlawyers apoplectic. I heard 
their outrage as a turf issue and missed the real message. The 
nonlawyers not only rejected the notion that mediators should be 
required to  be lawyers, they thought lawyers should not mediate. 
It  had nothing (at least not much) to do with non lawyers want- 
ing the work. They believed that most lawyers were incapable of 
shedding their adversary system indoctrination and perspective. 
Ergo, lawyers would make poor mediators. 
The last item on the Institute agenda-court-annexed ADR- 
should have made the division I have suggested between excisers 
and engrafters obvious even to  one as unsophisticated about 
ADR as I was. If the nonlawyers were really, but unknowingly, 
looking for an alternative to  the adversary system, not just tri- 
als, what better subject than court annexed ADR to bring that to  
their consciousness and into the discussion? It did not happen 
and there is an important lesson for the ADR movement in that 
failure. 
Everyone wants ADR to "succeed," even if for different rea- 
sons. Professor Frank Sander, the architect of the multi-door 
courthouse, led the Institute discussion of court-annexed ADR. 
Some cautions were expressed about infringing on the right to  
jury trial, forcing litigants to  an extra procedural stop before 
trial, and the theoretical inconsistency of mandating a process 
based on consensual p,&icipation. Despite the cautions, each of 
the Institute participants (including the leaders) seemed to think 
annexation of ADR by the courts was a most important step in 
achieving the goals of the ADR movement. The lawyers saw 
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court annexation of ADR as a way to relieve the pressure on the 
justice system, so it could operate better for all concerned. The 
nonlawyers saw court annexation of ADR as a foot in the door, a 
way to  begin converting an inferior adversary system to a supe- 
rior problem-solving method of resolving disputes. 
Court annexation of ADR was the only subject during the 
Institute about which I had a firm opinion. I was persuaded that 
court annexation was a bad idea, but I was unable to  persua- 
sively articulate a reason to myself, let alone to anyone else. 
I now know why court annexation of ADR is bad for the ADR 
movement. If our litigation system becomes the sponsor, sup- 
porter, and "success" of ADR, ADR will lose its unique character, 
and with it, its value to a society already too adversarial for its 
own good. It  is that idea and its consequences that take up the 
remainder of this essay. 
'WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY AND THEY ARE Us!"17 
ADR IN THE LAND (THE MULTI-DOOR COURTHOUSE) OF LAWYERS 
Those who believe that trial is the evil for which an alterna- 
tive is needed should be exuberant. Legislators have discovered 
ADR. They think it will save taxes. At the federal level, the Civil 
Justice Reform Act of 199018 and the Administrative Dispute 
Resolution Act of 199019 are but two examples. Courts have dis- 
covered ADR. They think it will clear dockets. State courts, as 
well as federal, are jumping on the bandwagon. The growing 
number of states with multi-door courthouses makes Professor 
Jefiey Stempel's observation that "the practicalities of court 
pressure, public preference, and political power ensure that ADR 
in some form will be part of the judicial system for at least the 
foreseeable future"20 appears unassailable. 
An alternative to  "tial," unfortunately, was the last thing for 
which this t i a l  lawyer was searching. My experiences with trials 
were positive. Even in complex cases with large amounts at 
stake, trials were relatively quick, painless, and produced re- 
sults that seemed as right as one might expect from any after- 
the-fact exploration of "what happened." 
17. Pogo, great swap philosopher and one-time staple of the comic pages of most 
of America's newspapers. 
18. 28 U.S.C. $5 471-82 
19. 5 U.S.C. 5 574 
20. Stempel, supra note 4, at 301. 
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The further I became removed in time, geography, and popu- 
lation size from that satisfying experience as a trial lawyer, the 
clearer it became that the road to  those quick and painless trials 
was increasingly long and torturous. Trial lawyers were all but 
extinct by the late 1980s, except for those trying criminal cases 
and a few personal injury lawyers. They had been replaced by a 
group of people calling themselves litigators. 
The civil pretrial swamp in which litigators work and 
through which they &rag their clients might have been the Hell 
of Dante's Divine Comedy, had he known about it. There are 
scholarly apologia for the civil litigation system as the best dis- 
pute resolution system ever devised,2l but if you asked clients 
you would find a different attitude. Most clients (and any litiga- 
tor  whom you could persuade to speak honestly about it) would 
tell you that the pretrial process is so full of delays, battles over 
secondary matters, and adversary attempts to  avoid disclosing 
information that it is hardly worth the candle. 
I had become interested in ADlR as an alternative to  that 
system of civil dispute resolution that encouraged the parties or 
their lawyers to  engage in an unmonitored war of hide-and-seek 
or harass-and-delay. :Learning that the justice system had dis- 
covered the "wisdom" of ADR and was annexing it to the already 
overloaded and dysfunctional litigation system was not what I 
wanted to  hear. ADR adherents who are cheering court-annexed 
ADR-because they b'elieve it will improve the justice system by 
making it more like ADR-should take a lesson from the discov- 
ery "revolutionn of the late 1930s and 1940s. 
The proponents of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the 
current model for most pretrial schemes in the United States) 
thought they were going to  make the justice system better, 
faster, and fairer.22 In a sense, they were the first ADR propo- 
nents. They wanted to put an end to "trial by ambush." They 
envisioned a future in which parties would become fully aware of 
the facts through a kind of nonadversarial exchange of informa- 
tion before trial. They wanted resolutions based on all of the 
relevant evidence. They believed fill disclosure would lead to  
more settlements of an amicable and informed nature and fewer 
trials of an adversarial and uninformed nature. And should trial 
21. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 4. 
22. For a balanced overview of the "intent" of the drafters, see Judith Resnick, 
Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U.  CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986). 
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be inevitable, they did not want the result to be wrong because 
one party could not produce evidence in the exclusive possession 
of the other. They wanted a system that did not so heavily favor 
the information holder, often the malefactor. They believed that 
settlements, as well as trial results, would better mirror what 
really happened than the results achieved by a system with al- 
most no discovery. Although the drafters knew they were adding 
rules of discovery to  an adversary system, they thought the rules 
were designed to facilitate a kind of "simple and effica~ious"~~ 
system of disclosure that would result in quicker settlements 
and better trial results. 
It did not work out that way. The shorter "ambush trial" has 
been replaced by the longer pretrial war of attrition. The adver- 
sary system did more to  change the nonadversarial disclosure 
notion of the Rules of Civil Procedure than the Rules did to 
change the adversary nature of the justice system. It is undoubt- 
edly true that some parties have gathered facts about their claim 
or defense under the discovery system that they might not have 
learned in the prediscovery days. It is not so clear that the re- 
sults of today's trials following discovery provide a better mirror 
of the events in question than those ambush trials of 
prediscovery days. The rectitude of trial results is one of those 
things beyond either empirical or anecdotal proof. Whatever the 
added benefit from discovery to individual parties or to  adver- 
sary justice in general, it has come a t  significant costs of time, 
money, and aggravation not imagined by those who invented the 
system. This is due, in large part, to a failure to  understand that 
lawyers would not treat pretrial activity as a time for open and 
honest disclosure. 
Litigators have treated pretrial as a time for adversary activ- 
ity aimed a t  gaining an information advantage, developing im- 
peachment ammunition, limiting the opponent's trial options, 
and harassing the opponent into a less-than-fair settlement. It is 
common understanding (whether or not actually true) that law- 
yer pretrial behavior in the past quarter century has become 
much more aggressive (often outrageous) than anything any trial 
lawyer ever did in a courtroom-where the fact finder sees what 
the lawyers are doing and judges the client's case in part on the 
credibility and the conduct of the lawyer. 
23. See Alexander HoltzoE, Instruments of Discovery Under Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 41 MICH. L. REV. 205, 224 (1942). 
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When the litigation culture of using discovery to  gain every 
competitive advantage was developing in lawyers' conference 
rooms, there were no practical checks on what lawyers could do. 
It was laissez-faire adversary discovery without enforceable 
rules. Outrageous conduct--everything from purposeful delay 
and destruction of evidence to  unbelievable harassment of wit- 
nesses and lawyers-became so common that the stories ceased 
to  be surprising. The cvnendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure of the 1980s and 1990s mere aimed at encouraging 
sanctions. Trial "referees" evolved, in Professor Judith Resnik's 
apt description, into "managerial judges."24 The amendments to 
the Rules of Civil Procedure had limited success in reigning in 
lawyer conduct. Some of them, most spectacularly Rule 11, have 
succeeded only in spawning new places for new kinds of pretrial 
wrangling. Professor Stephen Yeazell offers a most picturesque 
description of the effect of the Rules in changing and the ineffec- 
tiveness of the "managerial judges" in controlling lawyer behav- 
ior: "control of litigatic~n has moved further down the legal food 
chain-from appellate to  trial courts, and from trial courts to 
lawyers."25 The clients who suffer in the system, no doubt, see 
the sharks pooling. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure effectively moved the 
determinative part of the adversary contest from the light of the 
courtroom to the dark of the lawyers' conference rooms, with the 
unintended effect of making the adversariness of the system 
longer, stronger, and more expensive, to  boot. ADR will suffer 
the same fate. The disclosure rules did not make the justice sys- 
tem more fair and less adversarial. The justice system became 
less fair and more adversarial. ADR will not make the justice 
system more like ADR. The justice system will make ADR more 
like litigation. The changes are already apparent. 
There are many forms of ADR (negotiation, early neutral 
evaluation, arbitration, minitrials, and summary trials), but 
mediation is the paradigm. Supporters of mediation have argued 
that any settlement achieved in a consensual process is likely to 
be "better" than one imposed by adjudication-better in fairness, 
acceptance by the parties, and the civility of the process. Media- 
tion promises the possibility of less formality, less concern for 
24. See Judith Resnik, hlanagerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982). 
25. Stephen C. Yeazell, I'he Misunderstmd Consequences of Modem Civil Process, 
1994 Ws. L. REV. 631, 647. 
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legal rights and process, and more attention to individual con- 
cerns and solutions-more attention to problem solving. It can 
be done without lawyers. It can be done without publicity. It can 
be done without weighing down the result with concern for how 
subsequent disputes might be resolved. 
Now the justice system has hold of ADR. 
Consent, so central to  the notion that the parties and society 
will profit from solutions by agreement, has been replaced by 
mandatory participation. Even in those court-annexed programs 
where mediation is not mandatory, it has been my observation 
that many judges trying to  clear dockets coerce parties into me- 
diation. Many ADR proponents, paradoxically, support the effort. 
Some believe that mediation is so superior to  adjudication that it 
will take over the courthouse. Others believe it is so important 
to  society-and so unlikely to be used without coercion-that 
consent should be ignored in order to save mediation as a viable 
dispute resolution alternative. Professors McEwen & Milburn, 
for example, offer the paradox that people "forced" to participate 
in the consent-driven process of mediation, nevertheless, are 
often pleased with and profit from the process.26 
The notion that nonlawyers with different skills, perspec- 
tives, and substantive knowledge will bring a refreshing differ- 
ence to mediation has been replaced by the notion that only law- 
yers can mediate. The concept of the mediator as facilitator, 
someone who would empower the parties and pave the way for 
an agreement that would prosper because of the parties' stake in 
it has been replaced by the mediator as pseudo-decision maker. 
The idea that something other than rights and legal process 
might inform agreements has been replaced by the idea that 
mediators will trash the parties legal positions or bash their 
demands until the parties, exhausted, meet in the middle. 
Putting mediation into the courthouse has made both media- 
tion and the court processes more, not less, cumbersome. Even 
parties with cases that ought to  be adjudicated are forced into 
the time, expense, and seeming irrelevancy of mediation. 
Professor Stempel's suggestions for updating Professor 
Sander's multi-door courthouse are exemplary of what happens 
when you give lawyers control of a dispute resolution mecha- 
26. See Craig A. McEwen & Thomas W .  Milburn, Explaining a Paradox of 
Mediation, 9 NEGOTIATION J .  23 (1993). 
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nism. When you put ADR into the courthouse, it begins to look 
like litigation: 
Sander's screening clerk, who would pick the right "door" 
for the dispute would be "upgraded to  a judicial officer 
of substantial training and di~cretion."~~ 
The clerks who work for the new "upgraded judicial offi- 
cer" should be "lawyers with training and background 
substantially similar to  that of United States Magis- 
t r a t e ~ . " ~ ~  
After the "Intake Magistraten requires the parties to  
participate in a process for deciding which door should 
be used, and after the magistrate decides which door 
is available, the parties have a "limited right of ap- 
peal to a judge assigned to  preside over this aspect of 
the court's ~aseload.'"~ 
If one ADR procedure does not work, the parties might be 
required to participate in further ADR procedures 
before being admitted to the sanctity of a triaL30 
The no-discovery culture of traditional ADR would be 
replaced b;y early discovery, not only to aid in the 
ADR resolution, but also to determine which ADR 
method should be used in the first in~tance.~' 
Instead of using volunteers to  do the ADR work, the me- 
diators, arbitrators, e t ~ .  should "receive sufficient 
compensation and benefits so as to attract society's 
most able 
The entire ADR process should be subject to appellate 
review.33 
A party should not be involved in ADR without legal rep- 
re~entation?~ 
27. Stempel, supra note 4, at 370. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 371-72. 
30. See id. at 372. 
31. See id. 
32. Id. at 373. 
33. See id. at 374-75. 
34. See id. at 382. 
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Mediators should be able to actively intervene and to 
force parties into a different method of ADR or to 
trial:= 
The compelled ADR results would be admissible if the 
matter eventually came to trial?" 
Some or all of the above might be fine for an adversary sys- 
tem trying to  change the way it handles cases, but none of it is 
good for developing alternatives to  the litigation system. None of 
it is good for ADR-a cheaper, fairer, less contentious, and sim- 
pler way to resolve some disputes. 
The problem is lawyers. I do not mean to  suggest that some 
lawyers are not fine ADR practitioners, both representing people 
and facilitating ADR procedures, but that does not mean one 
should choose lawyers as the group to define ADR. And when 
ADR goes into the judicial system, it will be defined by law- 
yers-more specifically, by the concerns that lawyers are trained 
to  protect. The law and lawyers are concerned with who is right, 
which procedures constitute due process, creating precedents 
that defme normative behavior, and creating results that are 
acceptable enough to  society so that it will not opt for some less 
acceptable method of resolving disputes, such as reliance on 
might. Moreover, in our society, "justice" depends upon the as- 
sumption that "truthn will be most readily discovered by an intel- 
lectual war between trained gladiators representing competing 
ideas. 
The discovery revolution again provides a useful warning for 
ADR proponents who believe they will advance ADR and im- 
prove the justice system by putting the two together. It is impos- 
sible to prove that lawyers caused the trial system to deteriorate 
into the litigation system, but it is ciear they were around when 
it was happening. 
The more cynical view might suggest that the litigation 
change in lawyers and lawyering was coincident with the explo- 
sion in the number of lawyers, the exponential increase in large 
law firms, and the religion of lawyers--charging for work by the 
hour rather than the task. Conscious or not, the legal services 
35. See id. at 379, 383. 
36. See id. at 376. 
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industry had a stake in litigation that took longer, required more 
people, and involved more intricacjr--even if the intricacy had 
nothing to  do with the merits of the dispute, but centered in- 
stead on how the game was being played. The more charitable 
explanation is that lawyers are acculturated to believe that the 
adversary common-law process is the best way to  order society 
and are trained in techniques to perpetuate and effectuate that 
system. 
In either event, when asked to mold something foreign into 
an effective adjunct to  their adversary system of justice, lawyers 
will, invariably, mold it into a shape with which they are famil- 
iar. Professor Stempel's view provides an exquisite example: 
Although the debate will undoubtedly rage about whether this 
constitutes "real mediation" or justifies mandatory programs, it 
seems inevitable that mediation officers must be willing to 
depart from passive neutrality when warranted (just as a judge 
does), and that mediation, like any form of disputing, probably 
works better when lawyers (the world's leading dispute resolu- 
tion specialists) are part of the proce~s.~' 
It is not that lawyers are bad people. It is that we cannot 
help it. Part of the reason that adjudication works so well-if we 
finally get around to it-is that lawyers are well trained to look 
at and describe the world in a particular way. 
ADR proponents are not the only ones who ought to be wary 
of court-annexed ADB. Lawyers ought to be equally leery of putt- 
ing ADR methods into the justice system. It is a shame that in 
pursuit of our goal of adjudicating truth, we lawyers have so 
cluttered the system that it does not work as well as it might. 
We will not gain much ground, however, by constructing still 
more courthouse hurdles in front of the courtroom door. Our 
unique system of truth through intellectual battle suffers from 
too much process, not too little. If its supporters want to pre- 
serve a system that provides societal norms through judicial 
precedents, they ought to  wony less about incorporating ADR 
and worry more about stripping the system of the pretrial ad- 
versarial clutter that bludgeons parties into settlements instead 
of decisions. It is trial, not settlement, which validates the sys- 
tem. If the system does not vindicate rights, assign fault, and 
create societal norms through trial results, it is not worth the 
37. Id. a t  383 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
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time and money society pours into it. That is not to  say that all 
cases ought to  be tried. It is to say that the value of the system 
is in the trial results, not the settlement results. Settlements 
may be valuable, but not for establishing rights, fault, and soci- 
etal norms. Moreover, settlements are more easily achieved in 
other settings. 
A judicial system dominated by the lawyer's perspective is 
certain to  care more for rights and process than is necessary to 
resolve every societal disagreement. 
Where should we deal with those disagreements that do not 
need all the rights and process due in the justice system, with 
those disagreements that might profit by other considerations? 
An effective trial system for assigning fault, blame, or liability 
might not reach the "proper" resolution for all disagreements. 
Trial might not be worth the trouble for all disagreements, even 
if it reaches the "proper" result. Individuals may not be as well 
served by the "right" result as they would be by the "right" pro- 
cess. Trial might be a more expensive, lengthy, and public pro- 
cess than some might wish or prudence might dictate for the 
resolution of their problems. The culture promoted by constant 
resort to fault and rights determinations for all of society's dif- 
ferences might not be as useful as a culture promoted by commu- 
nitarian values. 
This is not to  say that the adversary system is not an impor- 
tant tool for resolving disputes. Not even the 
postmodernists-the most recent school of scholarly attack on 
the adversary system-want to  abandon it entirely. Professor 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, in her devastating critique of the adver- 
sary system, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a 
Postmodern, Multicultural World, for example, allows that the 
adversary system '%as its value."38 
A decision about fault and liability is often critical to future 
community peace, psychologically important to individuals, ther- 
apeutic for society at large, and a useful way to establish societal 
norms. Many disputes cry out for adjudication and ought to  be 
38. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a 
Postmodem, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 40 (1996). 
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subject to effective resolution in court. The problem is that there 
are very few disputes that can be effectively adjudicated in our 
society. There are too few trials to provide either vindication or 
precedent. We have a brutal "on the way to trial" system that 
results in settlement by accident, judicial coercion, surrender, or 
exhaustion. We, lawyers of the 1980s A d  1990s, have proven 
beyond disagreement that we are incapable of maintaining an 
adjudication system in a manner worth the effort. 
If we are to find a better way to resolve disputes in our soci- 
ety, the first thing we must do is fix the one door that every 
courthouse must have-the door to the courtroom-rather than 
to spend our time worrying over the design for a multi-door 
courthouse. Nothing else will matter if we cannot fix the trial 
door. The individual equality provided by our justice system's 
trials is deep in our cultural psyche and central to our under- 
standing of society. At one level, Professor Fiss is right, we can- 
not tolerate a world in which all disputes are resolved by settle- 
ment, a system of adversary ju~tice.3~ The more we settle, the 
less we try. The more our justice system develops a settlement 
mentality, the less vigor it will have for trying those cases that 
ought to be tried. Putting ADR doors on the courthouse only 
further increases the likelihood of settlement by exhaustion, 
while it reduces the number of disputes passing through the trial 
door. 
This essay is not primarily concerned with all the details of 
how to repair-maybe open is a better tern-that trial door, but 
it is clear that more trials will occur only if there is less wran- 
gling and decision making before tirial and greater expedition 
and acceptability during trial. Professor Yeazell's telling obser- 
vation that the percentage of federally filed civil cases resulting 
in trials dropped by almost 80% in the half century since the 
advent of the Rules of' Civil Procedure4" cannot be attributed to 
coincidence. 
Replacing discovery with disclosure would be a first step to 
fixing the trial door. Without elaborating an entire statutory 
scheme, one can imagine that a rule of full disclosure with crimi- 
nal penalties of the kind we now assess for testimonial perjury 
might be at least as effective for information exchange as the 
current system of adversary discovery. Changing the rules of 
39. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
40. See Yeazell, supra note 25, at 633. 
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evidence to conform more with the way we process information 
for making other important decisions might both speed up and 
tune up the trial process. Trying cases only before juries com- 
prised of the first twelve people randomly selected from the com- 
munity-no judges-might provide a system of decision making 
that truly reflects the composite values of the society. 
The above suggestions will draw howls of protest--detailing 
the ripple effect of the unintended consequences of such non- 
sense-from those currently toiling in the adversary system. 
These suggestions are not offered, however, as something to  be 
done in isolation tomorrow. They are offered to make the point 
that there are many possibilities for reform of the trial system, if 
one is first clear about what the trial system is designed to ac- 
complish. 
If an absolutely accurate reproduction of past events is the 
object of trial, then there may be something to  the howls. Adver- 
sary searching may turn up some information that disclosure 
under the penalty of prison might not. The pe jury laws do not 
stop all witnesses from lying. The current rules of evidence 
might keep out some unreliable information that a more permis- 
sive scheme might allow. Trained judges might be marginally 
better at finding facts than twelve randomly selected citizens. 
(The author does not happen to believe this, but has observed 
that a majority of federal judges and many commentators do). 
If, on the other hand, one appreciates the trial system as 
principally a vehicle for establishing societal norms, an instru- 
ment for resolving disputes that will discourage brawling on the 
street corner, and a participatory mechanism for imposing com- 
munity values on dispute resolution, one might have a different 
view of what changes in the trial system might be reasonable. 
Fixing the trial door is important to  the vindication of many 
core societal values, but that does not mean that every dispute 
should be handled in a trial system or that those core values 
must be vindicated for every dispute of a particular kind or for 
every particular kind of dispute. But try to  persuade the public 
of that. Despite the mess we have made of the judicial system 
and the pain it inflicts on those clients with the temerity to try 
it, "1'11 take it to court" remains the almost universal response to 
disagreements in our society. It matters not how trivial the dis- 
pute or how unhelpful a trial resolution might be to the individ- 
ual or to society at large. 
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The school did not choose your overweight daughter to be a 
cheerleader. "Take it to  court." 
Your neighbor's tipple tree sheds its apples into your yard. 
"Take it to  court." 
Your car was part of one of this year's tens of thousands of 
road accidents. "Take it to court." 
You don't like the boss's jokes. "Take it to  court." 
You don't want your former wife to  raise your son. "Take it to  
court." 
You don't want your neighbor to park his RV next to  his ga- 
rage. "Take it to court." 
You don't want a halfway house in your neighborhood. "Take 
it to  court." 
You don't want an X-rated theater in your neighborhood. 
"Take it to court." 
You don't like the condition of something you purchased. 
"Take it to  court." 
You did not receive all you hoped for from a product. "Take it 
to court." 
Something thought to  be safe three decades ago turns out not 
to  be. "Take it to  COW." 
Legislatures, religions, minor scuffles, community pressures, 
consensus, respected elders, and the force of cultural tradition 
have all been diminished as means for solving some societal 
problems by: "I'm right. I'm going to  court." 
Rejecting the multi-door courthouse as the forum for han- 
dling those disagreements that ought not to  be in a trial system 
does not mean rejecting the ADR movement and leaving every- 
thing to trial. Quite the contrary, rejecting the multi-door court- 
house means giving life to the notion of alternative, to escape 
from the adversary system of justice. The ADR movement had a 
chance to help us change our obsession with the law, until it 
joined the law and lclst its character--or its soul, if you are so 
inclined. The multi-door courthouse does not provide alternative 
dispute resolution; i t  provides substitute dispute resolution. 
ADR in the courthouse is just another way to  finish the journey 
through the swamp we call litigation. 
We need alternative places and alternative methods for solv- 
ing some of society's problems. We need to have something more 
than a substitute forum in a litigation system to show for the 
innovation and the effort that went into the modern ADR move- 
ment. We need to find, again, that passion for alternative. 
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It is unsettling for this trial apologist to find himself-at the 
end of the search for ADR-agreeing with the original goal of the 
nonlawyer (anti-lawyer?) group in the ADR movement: establish- 
ment of some dispute resolution institutions outside of the ad- 
versary system. It is frustrating to realize that there is no alter- 
native to  litigation, because ADR has become a success by be- 
coming part of the litigation system. It is downright perplexing 
to find that the only people seriously pursuing dispute resolution 
alternatives outside of the litigation system are the 
postmodernists-people who have little regard for the adversary 
trial. 
The postmodern critique of adversary justice is unlike 
postmodern critiques in architecture and literature, where the 
label was first used. The seemingly nonsensical name (What is 
newer than new?) usually identifies those who react against 
modernism by self-conscious use of earlier styles or conventions. 
Legal postmodernists have no particular interest in a dispute 
resolution style or convention of the past--certainly not the pre- 
Rules trial. Their focus of deconstruction is an "adversary system 
[that] is inadequate, indeed dangerous, for satisfying a number 
of important goals of any legal or dispute resolution system."41 
It is jarring to  a trial lawyer who thinks that adversary sys- 
tem jury trials are crucial to the fabric of our society, to discover 
more shared goals with the postmodernists than with other trial 
lawyers, ADR advocates, or dispute-resolution commentators. 
Postmodernists reject the notion of adversary justice for 
many reasons that are beyond the explicit purpose of this essay, 
but they center their critique on the system's inability to find the 
truth. For example, Professor Menkel-Meadow's critique of the 
adversary system focuses on two propositions about truth: 1) 
"[blinary, oppositional presentations of facts in dispute are not 
the best way for us to  learn the truth;" and 2) "polarized debate 
distorts the truth, leaves out important information, simplifies 
complexity, and obfuscates rather than clarifie~."~~ 
I am prepared to  concede that trials are not perfect (maybe 
not even very good) truth-finding devices, but so what? Truth 
finding is not the primary purpose of the common-law trial. The 
primary purpose is to  resolve society's disputes through a pro- 
cess in which the disputants may be heard and through which 
41. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 3, at 6. 
42. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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community values may be brought to  bear on the decision. We 
indulge the myth that the adversary trial reaches the real truth 
(as did the proponents of the joust and every other adversary 
system) because it is required; it is part of our aspiration to im- 
mortality. But it remains a system for ordering the behavior of 
less-than-perfect people, by resolving their differences through 
the "informed" judgment of other less-than-perfect people, about 
a less-than-perfect rep:resentation of less-than-perfect perspec- 
tives on past events. Its imperfections, in a sense, are its 
strength. So long as truth is its aspiration, the imperfection of 
the disputants, the participants, and the fact finders are no rea- 
son to discard it. The poet teaches, "Ah, but a man's reach should 
exceed his grasp, / Or what's a heaven for?"43 
My insistence on the value of the social utility of the adver- 
sary trial, irrespective of its inability to guarantee the "truth," 
aligns me, paradoxically, with the postmodernists who also find 
important values other than truth that ought to be served by the 
dispute resolution system. Professor Menkel-Meadow asks: "I 
wonder what would result if we redefined our legal system to 
seek 'problem-solving' a:s one of its goals rather than 'truth-find- 
kg-' "44 
What, indeed? I take her reference to "legal system" to mean 
the full panoply of a society's dispute resolution system. And 
while I would leave "1;ruth-finding" to a trial-centered justice 
system (imperfect as tlrial results might be), it is time that we 
reduce the size and the importance of that justice system, so 
that different ways to avoid or handle disagreements might de- 
velop. It is one thing tot hold rights in high regard and to attach 
importance to blameworthiness; it is something else to be ob- 
sessed with it, as we seem to be. 
There are some changes in law and procedure that we could 
make to reduce the influence of the litigation system in our soci- 
ety, but we are speakir~g, ultimately, about a change in culture. 
A change in culture will come mostly from outside the justice 
system and the people who operate it, not from within. Because 
that is where I come out, it is discomforting to find ADR inside 
the justice system. That is where I came in. 
Deciding which disputes ought to be resolved outside of the 
courts and deciding how to persuade those with the disagree- 
43. ROBERT BROWNING, &DREA DEL SARTO. 
44. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 3, at 30. 
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ments to  go elsewhere are difficult-some would qgue impossi- 
ble-issues. While I have no more to offer than others about how 
to solve those difficult problems, it is clear that no progress can 
be made while those interested in alternatives focus on incre- 
mental changes in an adversarial litigation system. 
Are there other doors available? 
We do not often think of legislation as a dispute resolver, but 
it can do in batch what the common-law does one dispute at a 
time. If we had more systems like no-fault automobile insurance, 
would we have a less just society? Does the case-by-case assess- 
ment of negligence really influence how others drive? Does it 
redistribute wealth in a way that is more just than other, less 
costly methods? Private arbitration has been successful, both in 
homogenous communities, such as the diamond industry, and in 
the broader context of the commercial world at large. There is no 
reason to believe that private mediation would not become suc- 
cessful if the only mediation available existed outside of the 
court system. For people with problems that are larger in per- 
sonality than they are in dollars, mediation offers a more satisfy- 
ing result. For companies that develop large monetary disputes, 
but must deal with each other over time, mediation offers a re- 
sponse for both the money and the future. Other societies, and 
ours in an earlier time, have left some problems to  the exclusive 
- 
province of religion. A council of wise, usually, men, has been 
used by other societies to  regulate important societal behavior. 
(The Senecas, a matrilineal society, used wise women as well, 
and by all accounts, with equal success.45) Some societies-again, 
ours, in its earlier days-have preferred a five-minute fistfight to  
a year-long, hundred-thousand-dollar lawsuit that consumes the 
time and attention of the disputants, fiends, families, employ- 
ees, and, oh yes, their lawyers. (How much better would all have 
been served if the CEOs of IBM and Fujitsu--or pick your own 
decade-long corporate dust up--had been locked in a closet with 
boxing gloves, rather than spending tens of millions of dollars 
and years of attention on a dispute that ended up in a draw of 
sorts-a result equally likely to  occur in a fistfight between two 
out-of-shape CEOs with pillows on their hands?) 
While I do not mean to advocate a punch in the nose as a 
dispute-resolution method of choice for a peaceful society, it 
45. See ANTHONY F. C. WALLACE, !CHE DEATH AND REBIRTH OF THE SENECA 28-29 
(1970). 
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must be clear that many societies have prospered without taking 
every disagreement to a lawyer and then to the litigation ma- 
chine. To be sure, this society grew and matured more rapidly 
during a time when the days-of-litigation-per-person in the coun- 
try were substantially fewer than they are today. In order to 
reduce our reliance on litigation as the method for handling soci- 
ety's problems, we must create a world in which people recog- 
nize, at the outset, that there are doors other than the door to  
the courthouse. Once the person with the problem starts into the 
litigation system, the litigation ethic envelopes the problem, the 
litigation practitioners work on the problem, and values other 
than "rights" and "fault" have no chance. 
People outside the justice system, such as those nonlawyers 
attracted to ADR in the late 1960s and early 1970s, are critical 
to  the establishment of the multi-door world. It will not happen 
without their innovation and their advocacy. We, lawyers who 
share their interest in resolving some of society's disagreements 
through problem solving, must recognize the importance of help- 
ing them to establish institutions that will compete with the 
justice system, rather than bringing them into our intractable 
world of advocacy. 
The current pervasiveness of the legal solution in our society 
makes it imperative that we work on lawyers as well. Like it or 
not, lawyers will be the gatekeepers to dispute resolution in this 
society for the foreseeable future. Although they should not be 
expected to  lead the way to  resolving disputes outside of the 
justice system, they mcy be educated to understand that a more 
diverse dispute-resolution world will better serve their clients. It 
is the welfare of the client, after all, by which we justify our exis- 
tence. 
This trial lawyer's search for ADR, which led back to the 
courthouse from which he started, was fruitful despite finding no 
there, there. As with most searches, it is the searching, not the 
finding, that is of the most value. 
We, lawyers who are privileged to  teach and to shape tomor- 
row's lawyers, owe that search to our students. We need to  reori- 
ent our approach. We should return to consideration of the law- 
yer's role as steward for society's dispute-resolution mechanisms 
and as problem-solving counselor for clients. Many early ADR 
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courses were more about the personal development of the dis- 
pute resolution professional and the nonlegal options for the 
client than they were about the law, or even the technique, of 
ADR. The texts, the teaching, and the perspectives are shifting. 
Court annexation has made ADR a law-fhn profit center and a 
law school "skills" subject. We teach negotiation and mediation 
the way we teach Trial Advocacy. We focus on the "skills" that a 
lawyer must learn in order to "win" a negotiation or mediation. 
Even as we offer the win-win approach to negotiation, best cap- 
tured in Fisher & Ury's standard, Getting to Yes,46 we sell it to 
our ADR students as a technique for maximizing results for their 
clients, rather than as a different perspective on the solution of 
problems. We even send our students to negotiation competi- 
tions. Can mediation competitions be far behind? 
We owe it to our students to push their horizons beyond the 
craft of lawyering. The ADR course ought to be a convenient 
window to inquiry how we serve the society as stewards and our 
clients as counselors. ADR is where we ought to examine the 
limits to the usefulness of the adversary system, where we 
should consider the consequences to our society of an overly legal 
dispute-resolution culture. It is in ADR where our students 
ought to ask whether rights and fault ought to be the corner- 
stones for handling all of society's problems, or whether lawyers 
ought to have a broader perspective. 
Jurisprudence and legal philosophy are virtually dead in 
legal education-if student interest and course enrollments are 
any measure. It is not pedagogically cool to deal in the abstract 
when there is lawyering to be learned. ADR offers the opportu- 
nity to stretch our students' perspectives and inquiries beyond 
the craft they will practice a year or two after sitting in our 
classrooms. We can use this simulation course-the sure road to 
student engagement and interest-to slip in, while no one is 
looking, some concern for the lawyer's role in society. If we can 
expand our students' horizons to understand the value to their 
clients and to society of a world that can resolve some of its prob- 
lems outside of an adversary model, we might help to develop a 
world in which our students will continue to be considered use- 
ful. 
46. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, G ~ G  TO YES (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 
1991). 
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